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Abstract How do professional experts develop advice in the face of uncertainty? The
background for this question is that uncertainties threaten all forms of expertise because
they risk calling the professional claim into question and undermine the professional’s
epistemic authority. Adopting a multidimensional concept of uncertainty as its point of
departure, this article focuses on how a specific category of experts – forest professionals
– encounter and cope with uncertainty in their counselling activities, particularly uncer-
tainty related to climate change. The empirical material consists of an interview study of
publicly employed forest consultants in Sweden. The analysis identifies seven strategies
that are applied to cope with uncertainties. The findings indicate that a multidimensional
concept of uncertainty can explain why cognitive uncertainty is more easily managed
than other types of uncertainty. Moreover, uncertainty may not be a central obstacle to
offering advice; rather it can be actively used to gain authority and influence action.
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Introduction
Professional expertise is pivotal in our society. Through their compe-tence, authority and mandate, experts offer guidance to organiza-tions and individuals concerning how to address and decide issues
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that are remote from their everyday knowledge. Among other factors, the
changing nature of risk (Smith and Fischbacher, 2009) has been an important
source of the increased dependency on experts. A number of sociologists,
including Beck and Giddens, have discussed this situation, highlighting
expert-dependency and its implications in late modern societies. Because of
the increased role of technology and science, citizens and organizations seem
to have no choice but to trust experts. Organizations and governments
increasingly make use of expert knowledge as a means of steering society,
and knowledge making and policymaking have become increasingly related
and intertwined (Miller, 2001; Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2013). In a complex
and diffuse political landscape, science is an emerging measure of social
power, and policy analysts have contended that the cognitive stabilization
provided by expertise can be used to counterbalance the political destabiliza-
tion of the nation-state (Barry et al, 1996; Haas and Stevens, 2011). Thus, we
live in a society in which many risks are fundamentally research-dependent
and experts have a central role in guiding policymaking in addition to their
professional work.
However, other sociologists stress that expertise is in turmoil and science’s
capacity to deliver trustworthy and relevant knowledge is contested (Irwin and
Michael, 2003). Moreover, science is de-stabilized in the sense that it is
no longer necessarily presumed to offer true and un-contested knowledge.
One reason for this is the increasing stress placed on the uncertainty of all
knowledge claims, a position that is frequently articulated by scientists, stake-
holders and the general public (Lidskog, 2008). Another reason is that expert
knowledge flourishes in many institutional settings, resulting in a multitude of
partly contradictory expert messages concerning how to decide and act
(Pfadenhauer, 2006; Navin, 2013). A third reason is that citizens have – not least
through mass education – developed a competence to critically evaluate knowl-
edge claims, meaning that expert knowledge is not taken for granted but has to be
negotiated to be considered legitimate, valid and trustworthy (Nowotny et al,
2001). Opportunities arise for contesting and negotiating specific risks when
organizations and individuals regard expertise as having no privileged access to
truth and risk assessments as resting on numerous questionable assumptions.
This situation – which is extensively discussed elsewhere (cf. Nowotny et al,
2001; Collins and Evans, 2007; Callon et al, 2009; Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2013)
– results in new conditions for expertise and how to develop guidance in a
context of contestation and uncertainty. Thus, we observe the cognitive destabi-
lization of expert claims, which has left political bodies and expert communities
pondering how to develop a more robust – socially accepted and publicly trusted
– expertise (Lofstedt, 2005; van Asselt and Renn, 2011). In addition , there are
arguments for the importance of developing a new type of expertise, in which
epistemic authority (that is, a social position for authoritatively delivering
recommendations within a specific domain) is negotiated and developed in
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interaction with the organizations it aims to influence (Raviv et al, 1993;
Pfadenhauer, 2006). Expertise is still considered pivotal in transforming
uncertainties into governable risks (Lidskog and Sjödin, 2015). However, the
conditions that expertise must satisfy to fulfil this function have changed;
experts must now address both their own internal uncertainty (what advice to
give) and their authority (how to make the advice trustworthy). Thus, it is more
the rule than the exception that organizations make decisions based on
insufficient or uncertain knowledge, and professional expertise is central for
guiding decisions and actions.
These circumstances represent the point of departure for this article, which
focuses on strategies for providing professional expertise in the context of
uncertainty. The empirical aim of this contribution is to study a specific group
of professional experts: forest consultants in Sweden. There are at least three
reasons for investigating them: (i) Sweden’s de-regulated forest management
system heavily relies on social norms and knowledge distribution to shape
forest owners’ actions. Forest counselling is thus a central instrument for
steering Swedish forestry; (ii) uncertainties caused by the long-term perspective
that must be considered in forestry (the rotation period for Swedish forestry is
60–80 years, which means that the future consequences of climate change and a
number of other environmental and non-environmental issues must be con-
sidered); and (iii) the increasing complexity of the target audience of forest
counselling. This complexity arises because on-going changes in ownership
structures (not least due to urbanization processes) mean that an increasing
number of forest owners live remote from their forest properties and possess
limited knowledge of forest practices. Thus, forest consultants serve as an
illustrative case of a growing professional challenge: providing advice in the
presence of uncertainty. In addition to these reasons, there is a fourth: the
growing need to study risk governance in practice, not least the practical and
contextual reasoning of ‘street-level’ managers (Corvellec, 2009; Boholm,
2010), which is the focal point of this study.
Using an interview study, this article investigates how forestry consultants
provide guidance on issues affected by uncertainty. A particular focus is on
climate change, an issue that is simultaneously a high political priority and
affected by considerable uncertainty. How do forest consultants cope with a
situation in which there is a strong demand for action to create forests that are
less sensitive to climate change in an area that is also affected by numerous
uncertainties? The research questions are as follows: What are the main
challenges facing forest consultants when striving to maintain epistemic
authority? How do they approach uncertainties in their counselling work? The
article is organized into five parts, this introduction included. The second part
develops the theoretical approach applied in the study, describes the relation-
ship between expertise and professions and addresses different aspects of
uncertainty. The third part outlines the design of the study, including empirical
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area studies and the methods and data used. The fourth part presents the results
of the interview study, beginning with the challenges faced by the forest
consultants in their counselling activities, followed by the strategies they have
developed to cope with these challenges. The fifth and concluding part discusses
the implications of having no option but to acknowledge uncertainties when
providing counselling services.
Professions and Negotiated Expertise
Research has shown that it is often difficult to find solutions when knowl-
edge is scattered and uncertain, when there are different conceptualizations
of the problem, and when the actors involved prioritize the issue at stake
differently. If no general definition is agreed upon, there is rarely any
opportunity to formulate a joint plan for concerted action (Schön and Rein,
1994; Palmer, 2012). Even in cases involving a hierarchical model of
regulation, making and implementing decisions may be difficult if there are
too many voices against a proposal. In cases where regulation is primarily
based on norms and knowledge, discursive closure is essential because in this
case there is a need for the actors involved to share a common definition of
the problem that can guide their actions. Professional expertise – the task of
which is to conduct or suggest relevant interventions (Brante, 2011) – is
needed to know not only what the problem is but also how to address it.
Through their epistemic authority, experts define, describe and explain
bounded domains of reality, which facilitates for clients to make decisions
and develop actions.
The definition of the concept of ‘professional expertise’ stresses organiza-
tional positions and specialist knowledge. Traditionally, professions are defined
as being based on licence (the exclusive permission to perform and implement-
specific tasks) and mandate (to prescribe how others must act) (Hughes, 1981).
Jurisdiction – who has monopoly and control over a set of tasks – serves as the
link between professionals and their work (Abbott, 1988). Jurisdiction estab-
lishes the limits of the professional’s authority, mandate and legitimate scope of
action. In addition, professions are attached to a body of knowledge; to become
part of a profession, a candidate must prove that he or she has acquired certain
knowledge relevant for the profession (in most cases through an educational
programme at the university level) (Pfadenhauer, 2006). This focus implies that
organizational dimensions are made central, how educational programs are
developed, associations formed, professional jurisdictions and legal mandates
negotiated, and organizational boundaries drawn (Eyal, 2013). The content –
what professionals actually do, how they make use of knowledge and how they
address competing knowledge claims – is much less researched. However, this is
the focus of the sociology of expertise.
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An expert is commonly defined as ‘someone who masters skills with
recognized (indeed certified) competence which is called upon in decision-
making processes’ (Callon et al, 2009, p. 228). In modern society, experts are
pivotal due to their provision of the cognitive, technical and/or organizational
knowledge necessary for monitoring and control systems (Giddens, 1990; Reed,
1996). Expertise is always based in a claim of possessing specialized knowledge,
competence and skill. In that sense, expertise is also characterized by having a
jurisdiction: expertise constructs experts’ epistemic authority and credibility by
drawing sharp boundaries between scientific facts (which scientists should
determine) and publicly debatable and value-laden judgements (which citizen,
political representatives and others should determine), implying that all knowl-
edge claims outside the expert domain are de-legitimated as not being scientific
(Gieryn, 1999). Expert status is achieved by carving out and controlling a
particular knowledge area and then asserting one’s authority as the provider of
relevant knowledge for problem-solving within this area. Through this bound-
ary work, a certain type of knowledge – expert knowledge – is accorded
the legitimacy to define, describe and explain bounded domains of reality.
An important difference, however, is that the jurisdiction of expertise is rarely
of a juridical or quasi-juridical character, in contrast to a profession, which has
a formally regulated mandate. It is, for example, possible to assert that one is a
lay-expert on certain issues but not a lay-professional. This means that most
professionals are also experts (due to their base in scientific knowledge),
whereas not all experts are professionals (due to the possibility of gaining
specialist knowledge in an ‘uncertified’ way, that is, without formal training,
but also because their expertise may not necessarily be connected to their
occupation). This makes the ‘problem of extension’ (Collins and Evans, 2007)
more present and pressing for experts than professions; many claim to possess
expert knowledge, and hence it is difficult for clients to know who to trust.
In addition to this difference, there are a number of similarities between experts
and professions, not least that they both strive for epistemic authority, a
position from which they can influence their clients’ thoughts and actions
through cognitive means. Experts and professionals consistently make claims
that they possess better knowledge of a certain matter than do others, and if
this claim is trusted, they are positioned to influence others (Hughes, 1963;
Abbott, 1988; Collins and Evans, 2007; Callon et al, 2009). The professional
claim is dynamically and dually related to professional expertise and its clients;
claims are trusted because they are considered relevant and arrive from trusted
sources (professional expertise), and the professional experts maintain their
authority and position by delivering relevant guidance for their clients.
Forest consultants are a type of professional expert; they are accorded a
special mandate (through existing regulation) that other experts do not possess,
while their knowledge base is not exclusive but open to and challenged by other
specialists. A particular problem for professional experts is to gain authority.
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In contemporary society, authority is to a large extent contested and negotiated
(Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2004). Authority is not given but has to be earned,
and therefore, professional experts must take the client’s understanding of a
problem more seriously, both to be able to provide relevant guidance and to be
trusted by those whose action it seeks to influence (cf. Raviv et al, 1993;
Pfadenhauer, 2006). This is clearly the case for forest consultants. Both the
character of the forest and the interest and competence of forest owners must be
considered to offer advice that is both deemed relevant and likely to be heeded.
A particular problem in this regard is that the knowledge of professional
experts may be questioned by their clients, or at least relativized. As Giddens
(1991, p. 137) has shown, while expert systems have intruded all aspects of
society and, thereby, deskilled citizens to a large extent, other (partly compen-
satory) skills have developed. Not least of which is the dramatic growth in the
accessibility of knowledge through information technology, which has made
information-seeking capacity central. This means that nearly everyone can not
only form an opinion on a knowledge-dependent issue but also provide with
facts that support this opinion (and/or question those of others) (Webster,
2002). Forest owners may, through their own work with forestry and/or
knowledge acquisitions, similarly obtain knowledge and form opinions that
run contrary to those of forest consultants.
In addition, the growing prevalence of uncertainty radically increases the
possibility of divergent recommendations concerning proper actions. Strategies
to address uncertainty not only influence the outcome (what recommendation is
given) but also affect how actors become engaged in an issue and the extent to
which they trust professional experts (Peltola, 2013). Addressing uncertainty is
therefore critical for forest consultants to demonstrate their trustworthiness,
and it constitutes a dynamic condition for their counselling activities. What
makes issues involving uncertainty complex and dynamic is that uncertainty is
attached to various dimensions, four of which are of particular importance.
(i) Cognitive uncertainty concerns inadequate or contingent knowledge regard-
ing the causes and effects of a particular problem, which makes it difficult to
suggest relevant interventions. Moreover, in cases in which professional
expertise regarding a situation and the proper action to take is definitive,
cognitive uncertainty among other actors may hinder these interventions.
(ii) The cognitive uncertainty among other actors combined with the fact that
other actors may have conflicting interests contributes to strategic uncertainty
(van Bueren et al, 2003). This type of uncertainty means that it is difficult to
know what action others will take. (iii) Institutional uncertainty (Lidskog et al,
2005) arises when decision making is fragmented, making it difficult to
coordinate decisions and actions within a field – that is, to conduct interven-
tions. (iv) Normative uncertainty (cf. Dower, 2007) relates to the absence of
shared values and norms or to difficulties in prioritizing among the shared
objectives that exist. In most cases, the authority of professional experts is
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partly accorded due to their orientation towards the common good or the
public interest, but in cases of normative uncertainty, it is unclear what
the common good really is. These four dimensions of uncertainty should not
be understood as isolated but in dynamic interaction; one dimension of
uncertainty may influence another dimension of uncertainty.
Research Design
The context: Forest counselling in Sweden
Forestry is central to the Swedish economy. In 2014, the gross output of the
forest sector was SEK 216 billion (equivalent to approximately EUR 22
billion), and the forest and forest industry sector accounted for 11 per cent of
the total export value of all goods in Sweden (SFA, 2014, p. 294). The forestry
sector currently employs approximately 80 000 persons (approximately 2 per
cent of the total labour force), a large proportion of whom live in remote areas
with few other job opportunities. Thus, forestry-related businesses are very
important for the Swedish economy, and there is strong political consensus
that forest resources should be used in a way that ensures that they will
continue to generate wealth for coming generations. Swedish forest policy is
characterized by two main components: (i) the goal of preserving the
environment should be given the same importance as the goal of producing
woody biomass, and (ii) the governing principle of forest management should
be ‘freedom with responsibility’; that is, a set of rules should specify the
principles for forest use, while the Government acts by providing information,
advice and recommendations (Appelstrand, 2012). A third, but less articu-
lated, component is that the aim of forest policy is substantially more far-
reaching than the official policy goals and legal requirements, that is, a belief
and hope that through spreading knowledge and norms, forest owners will do
more than what the law requires. A unique feature of Swedish forestry is its
ownership structure; approximately 50 per cent of productive forestry land is
owned by individuals, 30 per cent is owned by private companies, and
20 per cent is publicly owned (generally by state-owned companies) (SFA, 2014,
p. 27). Individually held forestland generally takes the form of small parcels, with
approximately 3 per cent (330 000 persons) of the Swedish population owning
forestland. Individual forest owners have considerable latitude in how to manage
their forests. In a governance system that relies rather heavily on social norms
and guidelines to shape individual forest owners’ actions, forest consultants
play an important role in influencing forest owners’ practices.
Some 500 persons are permanently employed as forest consultants at the
Swedish Forest Agency (SFA). During 2014, approximately 30 000 forest owners
participated in individual field activities or group activities organized by the SFA,
and 16 000 participated in face-to-face counselling activities (SFA, 2015, p. 50).
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In addition to this counselling (which is free of charge), the forest consultants also
deliver commercial services, such as courses and plans for felling. In addition, the
forest consultants meet with forest owners when conducting supervision (felling
and re-plantation are regulated by the Forest Act).
Methods and material
This article draws on interviews with 19 forest consultants employed by the
SFA. In Sweden, the ownership structure varies geographically; in the southern
part of the country, non-industrial private forest owners predominate, whereas
state-owned or larger privately owned companies or corporations are the norm
in the northern part of the country. In addition, there are regional differences in
the size and composition of forests. Therefore, consultants were selected from
five geographically dispersed regions and from rural and urban areas to
transcend local and regional conditions and capture more general circum-
stances that apply to forest consultancy. Furthermore, the regions selected had
different experience of storm damages and, according to current forecasts,
differ in terms of the sensitivity of their forests to a changing climate.
A letter was sent to 59 forest consultants, of whom 19 answered in the
affirmative, 4 declined to participate in the study and 36 did not respond.
Only two interviewees were female, which reflects the general male dominance
among forestry consultants. All of them were experienced consultants
(on average, they had worked for the SFA for 22 years). All but one had
obtained professional education from a university.
The interviews were conducted from October 2014 to January 2015. The
interviews were semi-structured and used an interview guide that allowed the
interviewers to ask follow-up questions and expand on themes that emerged
during the interview. The interviews were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim.
A contextualized thematic analysis was conducted (Bryman, 2012) using NVivo
software to analyse the qualitative data. During the analysis, particular attention
was paid to thematising everything that was said concerning risk, uncertainty,
knowledge, advice and the consultants’ general working conditions. In so doing,
we reconstructed how the forestry consultants address uncertainties and trans-
form them into manageable risks. In the analysis, we use the notion of strategies to
capture the different ways in which the consultants cope with uncertainties.
Because of the relatively limited number of forest consultants employed by the
SFA, we do not provide information on the regions in which they work to avoid
identifying them (see the appendix for additional information on the respondents).
Challenges: Resource Constraints and Uncertainties
Despite no explicit question having been asked about it, constant cutbacks
emerged as a recurrent theme in all interviews. Organizational downsizing and
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budget reductions may be compensated for by developing other organizational
routines and ways to perform counselling. However, uncertainty may arise if
resources are constantly reduced or during periods of rapid changes to
organizational routines and work practices. In particular, the forest consultants
stressed: (i) increased administrative burden (due to administrative down-
sizing), (ii) less time for in-field counselling, (iii) difficulties in meeting the
demand for counselling, (iv) fewer possibilities to follow-up on suggested
interventions, (v) less time to keep up with new research and directives, (vi)
poorer tools for environmental protection, for example, reduced economic
resources for purchasing land for conservation purposes, and (vii) restricted
opportunities to counsel on production issues, such as cleaning and thinning.
Thus, the persistent reductions in the amount of time available for counselling
results in an uncertainty over how to effectively perform it, including how to
consider and address the four dimensions of uncertainty discussed below. In
addition, the struggle to maintain and achieve epistemic authority does not take
place in a material vacuum (Spinardi, 2014); resources are important conditions
for developing and implementing strategies.
Cognitive uncertainty
Nearly all accounts of cognitive uncertainty provided in the interviews relate to
climate change. Even when discussing general questions regarding knowledge
gaps, uncertainties involving climate change were frequently articulated.
In addition to climate change, some of the interviewees expressed uncertainty
regarding the long-term effects of clear-cutting on biodiversity and the possible
depletion of soils due to intensive forestry.
The forest consultants expressed certainty that climate change is taking place,
and they supported their certainty by referring to a multitude of sources, such as
general opinion, research, own personal experiences and the general policy of
the SFA. Thus, climate change is an important condition to consider in their
counselling activities. They simultaneously acknowledged considerable uncer-
tainties concerning the effects of climate change and how to address them, not
least: (i) the pace and magnitude of change; (ii) optimal tree species given the
changed climate; (iii) new or dramatic increases in destructive pest agents;
(iv) new conditions for clear-cutting (not least that wet soil will likely make it
more difficult to use heavy forest machinery); and (v) recurring storms causing
large wind-throws. A particular dilemma is that, because the forest cycle in
Sweden typically extends approximately 80 years into the future, decisions
taken in the present must consider future circumstances while simultaneously
being compatible with present conditions (for example, trees suited for a
warmer climate might not grow well today).
Many of the consultants are convinced that particular actions should be
taken in the face of climate change, such as blending in more deciduous species
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(for example, birch). However, they find that the cognitive uncertainties among
other actors (not least forest owners) may hinder such interventions. Cognitive
uncertainties thus constitute a challenge to the consultants’ epistemic authority
because inadequate or contingent knowledge makes it difficult to suggest
interventions.
Strategic uncertainty
A degree of strategic uncertainty follows from the governing principle ‘freedom
with responsibility’. A de-regulated system makes it more difficult to know
what action others will take. However, the forest consultants seem accustomed
to this situation and they stressed that the final decision rests with the forest
owner. Their general view is that forest owners generally heed their advice, and
in those cases in which they ignore them, it does not constitute a threat to the
consultants’ epistemic authority (that is, forest owners may generally trust the
consultants’ competence, even if they do not follow every suggestion).
A major reason for strategic uncertainty is the increasingly heterogeneous
composition of contemporary forest owners. Forest entities differ in size and
composition, and forest owners have different levels of competence in
forestry. Contemporary processes of individualization and urbanization have
further complicated this heterogeneous situation. Individualization entails the
dismantling of status-derived authority. Historically, the local forester was an
important person in the community. Some of the older consultants spoke of a
time when forest owners almost stood at attention when they met them. They
mentioned that some older forest owners that continue to occasionally ascribe
status-derived authority to them, whereas younger owners adopt a more critical
stance towards this type of authority. On the other hand, the older generation
may be more familiar with practical forestry and somewhat reluctant to adopt
new methods. One respondent summarized the differences as follows:
IP14: [The younger generation] take a more critical stance and ask a lot more
questions, which is probably natural because, for one thing, it’s a generational
question, but they also might lack basic knowledge, while the older category of
forest owners can be a bit troublesome because they’re often stuck in the old
forestry policy and are a bit hard to influence in that way, yet still they’re not
quite as critical. So you have to put it on completely different levels.
Urbanization has implied that an increased number of forest owners live
remote from their property. For geographical reasons it might be more difficult
to advise such owners, but the remote owners may also develop different
attitudes towards forestry. If they have inherited the forest as part of a family
farm – while having chosen a different and urban life for themselves – they
might be less committed to managing their forest. Or, if they mainly visit the
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property on vacations and such, they might be reluctant to adopt interventions
that change how the forest looks. There are also examples of urban elites
buying large properties as a life-style investment, without any prior knowledge
in forestry. Of course, these types of forest owners coexist with old types. As the
composition of forest owners gets more heterogeneous, the strategic uncertainty
increases. This means that counselling becomes more complex, as different
categories of forest owners are in need of different advice and will also adopt it
differently.
Institutional uncertainty
Swedish forest owners have considerable freedom in managing their forests.
Theoretically, this would imply a relatively uncomplicated counselling task for
the consultants: aid the forest owners in their work to meet the (few) legal
requirements and in their general management of their forests. In practice,
however, there are institutional factors complicating this task. As discussed
above, many contemporary forest owners lack theoretical and/or practical
knowledge in forestry, making them more reliant on external advice. The SFA
is far from capable of satisfying all of the demand for in-field counselling, whereas
forest companies are eager to provide in-field counselling – which facilitates their
purchasing the wood. It is more the rule than the exception that forest owners
allow forest companies to manage the operation in question, including marking
up the area and reporting the felling to the SFA. This is typically when the forest
consultants begin to play a role, as a felling report may alert them that specific
considerations should be made at the site. Several consultants interviewed would
prefer to enter the process at an earlier stage, when they would have better
opportunities to influence the forest practices of the forest owners:
IP15: So it could definitely be worthwhile if people, as you said, before they talk
with the representative, if they’d maybe talked with us, to get another viewpoint
on things, maybe a bit more objective.
The consultants portray the buyers as professional and honest; the difference
is that buyers have a strictly commercial perspective. In addition, forest
companies often outsource their production resources, using contractors for
the various operational tasks. This means that decisions are taken on at least
three different levels. One of the consultants summarizes the problem of
fragmented decision making:
IP12: It can be a bit difficult sometimes, because even the forest owners are often
several steps removed when, when a felling is being planned, that I might give
advice to the owner, and then he talks to a sawmill that will fell the trees, and the
sawmill has a subcontractor, and the subcontractor has a subcontractor to clear
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undergrowth, and it’s easy for something to get lost in all those steps. So it doesn’t
always turn out like either we or the owner had planned.
Institutional uncertainty also stems from organizational considerations
within the SFA. The resource constraints the agency has faced have resulted in
a reduced presence of consultants in the forest sector, making it more difficult to
influence and coordinate decisions taken within it:
IP16: There used to be ten districts in this county [now there is one, our remark].
Now the basis for cultivating, so to speak, a more tight, close relationship with
the forestry, it’s significantly worse.
These various forms of institutional uncertainty are indirect threats to
authority. Fragmented decision making makes it more difficult to conduct or
suggest interventions, that is, to fulfil the professional claim. Fragmentation
makes it more difficult for the forest consultants to identify feasible strategies to
influence forest practices.
Normative uncertainty
Swedish forest policy accords equal priority to preserve the environment and to
produce woody biomass. At the micro level of everyday forestry, this policy
implies an institutionalization of normative uncertainty. Forest consultants and
industry buyers often have different views of how this balance should be struck
at the individual site. A majority of the consultants interviewed find themselves
competing with the buyers to secure the forest owners’ attention; the consul-
tants constantly stress environmental values, while the buyers primarily
emphasize production value. The owners differ substantially in their attitudes
towards the environment and production, and hence how ‘rough’ the competi-
tion becomes varies. In addition, individual forest consultants differ in how they
value nature and production. This means that there are elements of internal
normative uncertainty at play:
IP11: Not to name names, but there are a number of people who might seem,
they’re very interested in conservation issues but don’t know a thing about
forestry in practice, and they might give the forest owners advice that, it’s
impossible to carry out with today’s machines, you’d have to go around with an
axe or something… I think, I think they’re on the wrong track, I really think so.
Other examples of normative uncertainty include how recreational/social
values should be weighed against production values or how nature values
should be weighed against cultural values (for example, old sallow of conserva-
tion value may grow amidst ancient remains that have cultural value). Even if
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the forest consultants have legal authority over certain issues, they unanimously
prefer to use counselling tools rather than issuing prohibition notices.
The reason for this is that they consider counselling effective, although the
primary reason is to avoid role conflicts; it is difficult to combine the role of the
‘law enforcer’ with the trust-based relationship between consultant and client.
Hence, normative uncertainty challenges epistemic authority in at least three
ways. First, if it is unclear what the common good or public interest actually is,
then the authority that typically flows from the professional expert’s orientation
towards such values is no longer effective. Instead, authority in such a context
requires that strong arguments can be made in favour of a value. Second,
internal normative uncertainty undermines authority derived from belonging to
a united profession because the presence of different value orientations within
the profession makes it possible to question the consultants’ claims with
reference to their own peers. Third, a permanent presence of values that
are often difficult to reconcile may erode the general trust in the ability of
professional expertise to provide normative guidance.
Strategies for Addressing Uncertainty
In our analysis, we find that the forest consultants employ seven main strategies
to address different types of uncertainty.
Disclosure and risk diversification
A central strategy for addressing the cognitive uncertainties surrounding
climate change is to disclose them to the forest owners. This is achieved by
referring to research with different conclusions and providing the forest owners
with different scenarios. The consultants often state what they (and the SFA)
feel is the most likely scenario. Referring to (divided) research on climate change
externalizes the knowledge uncertainties from the forest consultant profession,
and by presenting different possible scenarios, the consultants appear knowl-
edgeable. Rather than providing certainty, the consultants assume the role of
professional navigators in a landscape populated by risks and uncertainties.
Because the uncertainties of climate change are well known to the general
public, it is unlikely that the consultants would appear trustworthy if they did
not acknowledge them. Following from this approach to framing the issue of
climate uncertainty, the consultants strongly argue for a strategy of risk
diversification, such as planting different tree species and applying varying
forestry methods on one’s property. Some consultants also stress how a well-
kept forest – according to standard forestry practice – becomes more resilient to
extreme events such as storms and heavy precipitation. Here, the prevalence of
uncertainty is used as argument for active management. Uncertainty, then, is
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not only a hindrance to action, but it can also be used strategically to motivate
action.
Using historical references
When asked how they arrive at various interventions, the consultants often
refer to their theoretical and practical knowledge. However, the cognitive
uncertainties related to climate change and the strategic uncertainties related
to a more critical breed of forest owners mean that knowledge claims must be
supported by some type of evidence. In this regard, the consultants highlight the
importance of using historical references in their in-field counselling: visible
examples of the outcomes of various mechanisms in the forest. The basic idea is
that past and present circumstances provide information that can be extra-
polated into the future, resulting in a form of localized evidence-based practice.
Forest owners often have stands (that is, groups of trees) on their property that
differ in age, dominant species, interventions made, and so on, and comparing
the conditions of different stands to one another provides evidence of what is
effective. Thus, whereas climate change often is framed as a challenge that
renders historical knowledge less relevant, here, historical references are used to
motivate and guide interventions. By using historical references, the practical
knowledge of how forests work becomes relevant even when facing abstract
risks such as predicted climate change.
Contextualized and strategic counselling
Providing advice is an interpretative activity; to be effective, the advice-giver
must consider how particular advice will be understood by the target group.
As described above, forest owners are heterogeneous group, which forest
consultants must consider when developing advice. By gathering information
on individual forest owners and their intentions concerning their forests, it
becomes possible to develop relevant and feasible advice. The forest con-
sultants also stress that being a good listener is important for building trust.
In the interviews, they provided numerous examples of this type of con-
textualized counselling, including: (i) not suggesting interventions that are
unlikely to be executed by the forest owner in question, (ii) alluding to
historical continuity when arguing for more active management to an owner
who recently inherited her forest and (iii) avoiding complex theoretical
elaborations when interacting with inexperienced owners. Even if contextua-
lization can be partly achieved by using modern communication tools, the
consultants believe that it is nearly impossible to develop familiarity with a
forest without a physical visit, as every stand possesses unique features.
In addition, the consultants stressed that face-to-face interactions are the
most effective means for building trustful relationships.
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With less time for in-field counselling, it is less feasible to pursue the strategy
of contextualizing advice. The SFA has had several counselling programs
targeting specific issues in recent years, such as climate change, forestry and
water systems, procurement skills, and so on. Even if the consultants value such
temporary additional resources for in-field counselling, they also lament that
targeted programs offer less room for general discussions with forest owners.
This brings us to the related strategy of using strategic counselling. By this, we
mean that the forms of and circumstances for counselling are geared towards
achieving the best effect, and targeted programs would be an example of this at
the central level. The individual consultants also apply strategic measures in
their own practices, such as encouraging owners, buyers and contractors to
jointly attend in-field counselling. This is effective in countering institutional
uncertainty, as ‘group counselling’ facilitates negotiating and coordinating
actions. It also counters normative uncertainty, as group dynamics may be
effective in securing norm-following behaviour. In line with this, providing in-
field feedback to buyers (a form of strategic counselling) may have a discoura-
ging effect on future transgressions:
IP08: [W]e actually go out with the representatives and… They really do have to
account for themselves, “what the heck were you thinking? There used to be a
little stream here, now you’ve destroyed everything, by all means please explain
yourselves”. Maybe then it will be harder for them the next time they want to
plan a felling.
Negotiating values and decoupling practices
As stated above, in line with the Swedish forest model, the consultants aim
higher than the standard set by law. Therefore, a satisfactory end result from
the consultant’s perspective typically requires negotiation or bargaining.
Empirical accounts include: (i) asking a forest owner to save a stand of
particular conservational value, and suggesting greater felling in another area
as compensation, (ii) informing the forest owner of rare plants or birds
inhabiting the area, thereby getting her to reevaluate her forest and (iii) arguing
for recreational values that if preserved would also benefit environmental
aspects. The consultants believe that such negotiations are effective, at least in
convincing the forest owner and thus in maintaining authority. At a later stage,
a buyer might be equally successful in her negotiations with the owner, which
means that the end result might differ.
Resource constraints, however, may result reduced ambitions. For instance,
consultants regret they have little opportunity for counselling on production
issues. This also has implications for their epistemic authority because, in line
with their professional claim, the consultants are considered knowledgeable in
all areas regarding forestry. The consultants attempt to provide answers to any
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forest-related questions regardless of resource constraints. This is a mild but
common form of decoupling, that is, resisting change by doing something other
than what is formally prescribed within an organization (Meyer and Rowan,
1977). Decoupling might be a necessary strategy to uphold epistemic authority
in the face of resource constraints. Other examples of this strategy include
highly selective readings of internal information circulated and the continuation
of established local practices despite central directives. Hence, decoupling can
be used to address institutional uncertainty.
Conclusion
Forest consultants face a number of different uncertainties in their professional
practice and have developed a number of strategies to address them. In so
doing, they strive to gain, or at least maintain, epistemic authority without
compromising their professional claim. The results of this study support those
of earlier studies reporting that trust in authorities is something that is actively
achieved (Giddens, 1991; Reed, 1996; Pfadenhauer, 2006; Navin, 2013).
The interviewed forest consultants unanimously stressed the importance of
actively building trust by being context-sensitive and receptive to the forest
owners’ experience and interest. The contribution of this study is its stress on the
multidimensionality of uncertainty. This approach makes it possible to separate
different challenges that uncertainties may create and various strategies to
address them. In particular, we will stress four implications of this finding.
First, a multidimensional conceptualization of uncertainty makes it possible
to understand that the cognitive uncertainty in the case considered in this study is
a minor problem, despite that numerous public and scientific debates focus on this
type of uncertainty. The forest consultants stated that their profession is not
accountable for this type of uncertainty; it arrives from the scientific community.
By locating the uncertainty outside their profession, they can retain epistemic
authority while simultaneously articulating numerous cognitive uncertainties.
In this case, the forest consultants can be regarded as professional navigators in a
landscape populated by risks and uncertainties. By spreading risk consciousness
and providing a map of a risky terrain with no clear tracks, they create the
possibility for discussion and negotiation with the forest owners concerning the
optimal path. Thus, the advice the consultants provide indicates which risks to
avoid. One reason for this is, as Beck has stressed, that risk consciousness indicates
what to avoid but never what to seek (Slater and Ritzer, 2001; Beck, 2009).
Second, the study explains why other forms of uncertainty – strategic,
institutional and normative – are more difficult to address. Because they cannot
be easily located outside of the profession, these forms of uncertainty more
directly interfere with the consultant’s ability to perform in keeping with her
professional claim. For example, the professional claim involves: (i) knowing
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how others are likely to act, (ii) being able to coordinate decision making and
(iii) knowing how to balance between different policy goals (in this case,
between the forest policy goals of production and environment). Thus, stressing
strategic, institutional and normative uncertainties means that what is needed to
enable the consultants to provide advice is not primarily a question of gathering
additional (scientific-technical) knowledge.
Third, uncertainty is often framed in the scientific and public debate as
constituting a hindrance to action. However, uncertainties can also be used to
facilitate action. As our analysis has shown, uncertainty may not question the
epistemic authority of the forest consultants but can instead be used as an
opportunity for interaction, discussion and negotiation. Uncertainty can be
used as a ‘boundary-ordering device’ (Shackley and Wynne, 1996; Gieryn,
1999) that, in certain circumstances, serves as a means to reconcile different
interests (or to deepen the conflict between them).
Fourth, when confronting uncertainty, it is also important to stress the
differentiated role of resource constraints. Epistemic authority is often nego-
tiated and achieved in interaction with clients. As other studies have shown, this
interaction is often diverse, context-sensitive and dynamic (Corvellec, 2009;
Mahony, 2013). Epistemic authority is largely negotiated at the local level, in
concrete meetings between professionals and clients. As we find in our analysis,
with increasingly less time for in-field visits it may be difficult for the forest
consultants to maintain their epistemic authority on and influence over forest
owners’ practices in the long run. Under a de-regulated system – such as the
Swedish forest governance system – the importance of boundary spaces
increase; these are performative spaces where epistemic and normative author-
ity are negotiated and developed. Because of resource constraints, there is a risk
that the direct interaction with experts will be hollowed out, and virtual spaces
(for example digitalized services offered throughWebsites) may not successfully
develop relevant and applicable advice for all types of forest owners.
To conclude, uncertainty implies a multifarious challenge for the epistemic
authority of professional expertise. However, as this article has shown, these
challenges do not necessarily constitute a hindrance to professional experts’
strive to support their professional claim but can instead be addressed and even
actively exploited in the effort to provide advice and maintain and achieve
authority.
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Appendix
List of interviewees
Given the small number of publicly employed forest consultants in Sweden and
the fundamental importance of protecting respondent confidentiality, we do not
provide information about specific regions that were included.
[Respondent number. Position(s). Education. Years at the SFA. Interview date]
1. Forest consultant. Bachelor of Science in Forest Management. 30. 14-10-07
2. Forest consultant. No formal. 10. 14-10-13
3. Forest consultant. Master of Science in Forestry. 2. 14-10-16
4. Forest consultant/District manager. Bachelor of Science in Forest Manage-
ment. 20. 14-10-21
5. Forest consultant specializing in cultural heritage. Master of Science in
Archaeology. 7. 14-10-22
6. Forest consultant. Master of Science in Forestry. 38. 14-11-04
7. Forest consultant. Higher Education Degree in Forest Management. 13.
14-11-04
8. Forest consultant. Bachelor of Science in Forest Management. 13. 14-11-04
9. Forest consultant. Higher Education Degree in Forest Management. 31.
14-11-05
10. Forest consultant. Higher Education Degree in Forest Management. 34.
14-11-07
11. Forest consultant. Higher Education Degree in Forest Management. 35.
14-11-12
12. Forest consultant. Bachelor of Science in Forest Management. 31. 14-11-12
13. Forest consultant. Higher EducationDegree in ForestManagement. 26. 14-11-14
14. Forest consultant. Higher Education Degree in Forest Management. 32.
14-11-14
15. Forest consultant. Bachelor of Science in Forest Management. 3. 14-11-17
16. Forest consultant. Master of Science in Forestry. 33. 14-11-17
17. Forest consultant. Higher Education Degree in Forest Management. 1. 14-12-04
18. Forest consultant. Master of Science in Forestry. 30. 14-12-04
19. Forest consultant/Coordinator knowledge dissemination. Master of
Science in Forestry. 33. 14-12-01
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